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 Non-Technical Summary 
 
We investigate the effect of profit sharing on product and process innovation. The general aim 
of companies introducing profit sharing in their remuneration policy is to stimulate staff 
performance. As profit maximization becomes a win-win strategy to both the employees and 
the firm owners, their mutual interests become aligned. If the incentive system works in an 
efficient way and if employees behave rationally, they will increase their efforts, which 
should subsequently raise the company’s performance.  
 
While many studies consider the effects of profit sharing on firm performance in general 
(productivity, profitability), not much is known about the effects on innovation. In this paper, 
we introduce measures of technological progress in an attempt to unravel how  profit sharing 
may interact with firm performance through the realisation of both product and process 
innovations. We employ the IAB establishment panel, an extensive dataset on German 
establishments over the time periods 2005 to 2009. In order to eliminate possible selectivity 
effects, we apply static matching and conditional difference-in-differences methods. 
Based on the matching results, profit sharing companies outperform non-profit sharing 
companies on both process and product innovativeness. However, according to the results of 
the conditional difference-in-differences method only product innovation is enhanced by the 
introduction of profit sharing. Hence firms introducing profit sharing are already more 
innovative with respect to both product and process innovations before they launch the 
variable incentive method of profit sharing. But profit sharing additionally has a positive 
effect on product innovations. 
 
  
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Wir untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Gewinnbeteiligung auf Produkt- und 
Prozessinnovationen. Das allgemeine Ziel der Unternehmen bei der Einführung von 
Gewinnbeteiligung als Element der Einkommenspolitik ist die Motivierung der Beschäftigten 
zu einer höheren Leistung. Da Gewinnbeteiligung für beide Seiten einen Vorteil darstellt, 
kann sich eine größere Übereinstimmung der Interessen der Arbeitnehmer und der 
Kapitaleigner entwickeln. Bei einer effizienten Ausgestaltung des Anreizsystems und 
rationalem Verhalten der  Beschäftigten sollte sich der Unternehmenserfolg erhöhen. 
Während viele Studien die Auswirkungen von Gewinnbeteiligung auf die 
Unternehmensleistung im allgemeinen (Produktivität, Gewinnhöhe) untersuchen, gibt es 
wenig Evidenz hinsichtlich der Effekte auf den Innovationserfolg. In der hier präsentierten 
Untersuchung führen wir Erfolgsmaße für Innovation ein und betrachten die Auswirkungen 
der Einführung von Gewinnbeteiligungsmodellen auf Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen.  Wir 
verwenden das IAB-Betriebspanel als eine umfangreiche Datengrundlage zu deutschen 
Betrieben über die Jahre 2005-2009. Die Möglichkeit einer Verzerrung der Ergebnisse durch 
Selektionseffekte wird über zwei Methoden berücksichtigt. Einerseits werden statische 
Vergleiche zwischen Firmen mit und ohne Gewinnbeteiligung durchgeführt. Hierbei werden 
Unterschiede zwischen den Betrieben mit und ohne Gewinnbeteiligung hinsichtlich der 
Ausprägungen der exogenen Variablen über das Matching-Verfahren eliminiert. Andererseits 
identifizieren wir die Betriebe, welche eine Gewinnbeteiligung eingeführt haben und 
betrachten die Auswirkungen dieser Einführung in einem konditionalen Differenz-in-
Differenzen Ansatz.  
Auf der Grundlage der Ergebnisse des Matching Ansatzes sind Betriebe mit 
Gewinnbeteiligung denjenigen ohne Beteiligung sowohl in Hinsicht auf Prozess- als auch 
Produktinnovationen überlegen. Bei dem bedingten Differenz-in-Differenzen Ansatz findet 
sich jedoch ein positiver Effekt der Gewinnbeteiligung lediglich hinsichtlich von 
Produktinnovationen. Folglich sind die Betriebe, welche Gewinnbeteiligung einführen, bereits 
vorher innovativer. Gewinnbeteiligung kann jedoch den Erfolg bei Produktinnovationen noch 
weiter erhöhen. 
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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of profit-sharing on product and process innovation. Profit-sharing is 
a credible commitment of the companies to let the employees participate in any efficiency 
gain. Resistance against technical progress becomes less plausible. Moreover, employees are 
stimulated to share their specific information advantage on possibilities to optimize the 
production process and products with the management. We take account of possible 
selectivity effects and using survey data on German companies with and without profit-
sharing in a conditional difference-in-differences framework, we test our hypothesis by 
comparing measures of innovativeness. Based on matching (selectivity on observable 
covariates) in a static comparison firms with a share system show both more product and 
process innovations. In a dynamic setting, we find that the introduction of profit-sharing only 
spurs product innovation. 
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I. Introduction 
Knowledge has become a fundamental economic asset (see e.g. Romer [1990]) and 
determines companies’ competitive strength (Schumpeter [1942]). On the one hand, 
knowledge creation is a time and money consuming process, with an uncertain outcome 
(Dasgupta and Maskin [1987]). Optimal staff motivation is to the benefit of expected success. 
On the other hand, knowledge spreads relatively quickly into the public domain once it has 
been created, allowing other companies to take advantage of the originating company’s 
investments. Mansfield [1985] showed that a significant share of knowledge leaks out through 
employees. Therefore, in knowledge creating companies, it is vital to attract valuable 
employees and curtail the staff turnover and additionally, to motivate this highly qualified 
workforce. One important aspect is employee remuneration. A vast body of research is 
devoted to investigating optimal remuneration systems and it appears that monetary as well as 
non-pecuniary incentives matter (see e.g. Coombs and Gomez-Mejia [1991]), jointly 
optimized in a stimulating work environment with an attractive remuneration system. In this 
paper, we zoom in on one specific remuneration system, namely profit1 sharing: employees 
share in the profit of a company, through the receipt of financial rewards, depending on the 
company’s performance. Often, this financial incentive is disbursed as a supplement to the 
fixed base wage (see Kraft and Ugarković [2007], Bhargava and Jenkinson [1995] as well as 
Wadhwani and Wall [1990]). 
The direct aim of companies introducing profit sharing in their remuneration policy is to 
stimulate staff performance. As profit maximization becomes a win-win strategy to all parties 
involved, i.e. both the employees and the firm owners, their mutual interests become aligned. 
If the incentive system works in an efficient way and if employees behave rationally, they 
increase their efforts, which should subsequently raise the company’s performance (see Kraft 
and Ugarkovic 2006). Since a considerable time, profit sharing has been the subject of many 
empirical studies (see e.g. Pérotin and Robinson [2002] as well as Strotmann [2002] for 
elaborate surveys of this literature stream). The direct link between profit sharing and output 
explains why traditionally productivity has by far been the most often investigated issue in 
this research domain. Less frequently investigated topics are the effects on profitability and 
wages. The latter variable is investigated as Weitzman [1983] suggested using profit sharing 
as an alternative, instead of a supplement to the going wage rate. 
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Scholars typically find positive to neutral impacts of profit sharing on a firm’s output. 
However, productivity measures only show part of the picture, as they merely reflect the final 
impact, without illuminating possible reasons explaining this productivity increase. An 
efficient incentive system is expected to affect workers’ performance, but may additionally 
strengthen a company’s innovative capabilities, as theoretical arguments predict that potential 
resistance against innovative activity can be offset and what is even more, employees may 
actively cultivate the company’s innovative capabilities.  
In this paper, we introduce measures of technological progress in an attempt to unravel 
how the introduction of profit sharing may interact with firm performance through the 
realisation of both product and process innovations. This area has remained by and large 
unexplored until now. We employ an extensive dataset on German firms. In order to eliminate 
possible selectivity effects, we apply conditional difference-in-differences methods. In the 
second section, we briefly summarise the history of research on profit sharing and advance 
some theoretical considerations. The third section entails the strategy we follow in the 
empirical part, which is subsequently presented in two sections, covering the data description 
and the estimation results. The last section concludes with a summary of our findings, some 
limitations of our research set-up and lines for further research. 
Literature summary and theoretical arguments 
The literature on profit sharing can be categorized into two substreams. The first 
substream, which is especially supported by the European Community (see the so-called 
Pepper reports: Commission of the European Communities [1991, 1996] and Lowitzsch 
[2006]), tries to provide a framework for international comparisons and to quantify the 
prevalence of profit sharing in Europe and the US. However, definition problems and 
internationally different legislation schemes seriously complicate these studies and imply 
strong limitations with respect to their comparability.  
The second substrea*m of literature investigates the potential impact of profit sharing 
on various company characteristics. As mentioned before, the traditionally most investigated 
variable in this domain is productivity. The interested reader is referred to FitzRoy and Kraft 
[1987] as one of the first studies, Doucouliagos [1995] for a meta-analysis and to Pérotin and 
Robinson [2002] as well as Strotmann [2002] for elaborate surveys of the extensive literature. 
Overall, the conclusions tend to confirm small but positive productivity increases as a result 
3 
 
of profit sharing. Other variables which are studied in relationship with the existence of profit 
sharing are wages and labour demand (see Pérotin and Robinson [2002]), as well as 
profitability (Kraft and Ugarković [2006]). An important issue, which is nevertheless often 
ignored, is the fact that different selection mechanisms may play a part when studying profit 
sharing and its impact. This may seriously distort evaluation exercises and undermines the 
validity of the results. In the methodological section, we will extensively come back to this 
issue of selectivity.  
To the best of our knowledge, no studies exist on the impact of profit sharing on the 
innovative performance of companies. However, in the subsequent paragraphs we will 
advance theoretical arguments and predict a potential positive impact of this specific 
remuneration system on the company’s innovation process.  
Although a high-quality workforce is expected to produce highly valuable R&D and 
innovative output, there are two main motives why employees may hamper innovative 
activity. First, employees are expected to dislike technological change if its introduction 
implies re-training, alternative work organizations and adaption costs, in addition to potential 
dismissals. Training will most likely be firm-specific and thus the risk for the workers 
increases, which may therefore excite opposition against innovative activities within the 
company. Schaefer [1998] found that these frictions do not necessarily obstruct innovative 
activity, but nevertheless may seriously slow down or change the innovation process. Zwick 
[2002] proves that internal resistance against innovation is more likely if it is uncertain 
whether the employees benefit from the investment. Our second argument as to why 
employees may negatively affect a company’s technological progress and innovative 
capabilities works more directly. New technologies may enable companies to substitute 
labour by capital. This in turn may lower the demand for labour and therefore reduce 
employment and/or wages. As a result, employees may exhibit a substantial scepticism or 
even negative attitude towards technological progress. In that case, any attempt to modernize 
the company’s technological equipment or to conduct process innovations will be distrusted 
or even opposed.  
Profit sharing can provide an effective remedy to counter or even upturn these frictions 
and the potential negative pressure of human capital on R&D. First, the premium offered 
through profit sharing can be regarded as a compensation for the training and subsequent risk. 
Therefore, profit sharing may moderate employee opposition against technological 
advancement. Second, profit sharing may even stimulate the employees’ incentives to actively 
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support and contribute to process innovations. As profit sharing entails an explicit 
commitment on behalf of the company owners to share part of the profits with the employees, 
their mutual interests are aligned towards one denominator: profit maximization. Process 
innovations are expected to increase a company’s future profits, so technological progress is 
to the benefit of both parties. Employees are closely involved in the company’s bench level 
expertise and may therefore possess an information advantage on potential weaknesses and 
inefficiencies of the technologies in use. Without profit sharing there is hardly any incentive 
to disclose this information to the management. However, when employees participate in any 
profit increase, it is in their self-interest to fully exploit all available information. Hence, if the 
company employs a profit sharing system, employees will be less averse towards 
strengthening the company’s technological equipment, and, even more important, they may 
become a valuable asset in the process of technological progress. In this paper, we therefore 
advance the hypothesis that profit sharing fosters process innovation.  
At first glance less obvious but possibly also present is an effect of profit sharing on 
product innovation. During the production process, employees go through a learning curve: 
they accumulate knowledge, gain experience and subsequently may come up with ideas to 
improve a product’s quality. If a monetary incentive is coupled to the implementation of any 
useful suggestion on a product improvement, the likelihood that the employee discloses his 
ideas obviously increases. Similarly, employees may become aware of potentially interesting 
additional features of the produced goods. Hence, while it seems unlikely that employees can 
contribute significantly to the development of totally new products, they may possess a 
substantial potential to improve existing products to a significant extent. Moreover, some 
employees closely interact with the company’s customers and as a result are well aware of 
their preferences. They gather information on potential shortcomings of the existing product 
range as well as the customers’ needs and wishes concerning improvements of existing as 
well as desired features of future products. This valuable knowledge should be transferred to 
the company’s R&D department, in order to develop products along these lines. If the 
company succeeds in complying with these requirements, its market success is expected to 
rise and consequently also its sales of improved or newly developed products. Profit sharing 
generates clear incentives to share this information with the management as, in contrast to the 
traditional wage-based firm, its capitalization is shared with the source of information: the 
employee. In summary, our theoretical arguments predict that introducing profit sharing has 
the potential to stimulate both process and product innovation.  
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Empirical Strategy: the treatment of selectivity 
Although many empirical studies confirm the hypothesis that profit sharing has a 
neutral to significantly positive effect on the company’s performance, only a surprisingly 
small minority of firms actually employs this remuneration scheme. The percentage of firms 
with a profit sharing system is quite low in the European Union, except in France and the 
United Kingdom, where financial participation in companies is supported by a legal 
framework and substantial tax advantages (see Poutsma [2001] for an extensive description of 
country differences in the European Union). This seems to indicate that profit sharing is not a 
beneficial strategy to all companies, but only to certain firms. Strotmann [2002] denounces 
the fact that, even after the clear conclusion of FitzRoy and Kraft [1995] that different 
selectivity mechanisms may play a role in the evaluation of profit sharing, many studies do 
not or not sufficiently control for the potential distortion of the results due to these selection 
biases. This section first clarifies the different arguments supporting expectations about the 
presence of selectivity. Next, we expound how this problem is solved in our empirical 
analysis. 
A first reason for the rather low ratio of firms employing profit sharing might originate 
in firm-specific advantages or disadvantages with respect to different incentive schemes. 
Companies presumably differ in a number of aspects. For instance, the respective workforces 
may exhibit different qualification levels. Furthermore, firms may differ in their capability to 
validate individual performance. Examples are highly structured work processes, e.g. in the 
extreme belt production, or a team-based production process, where only joint, i.e. not 
individual, output is observed. In general, smaller firms suffer significantly less from 
problems in measuring individual employee performance. Other differences may stem from 
turnover rates, the workforce’s cultural and ethical background, industrial relations and many 
other characteristics. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to believe that firms that are able 
to capture specific advantages from profit sharing are likely to introduce this incentive scheme 
in their remuneration policy, while others show no interest and rather rely on other 
motivational instruments like tournaments, piece rates or efficiency wages. A second kind of 
selectivity is driven by worker sorting. Performance oriented and cooperative workers 
probably prefer working in profit sharing firms. These workers are presumably more 
productive, irrespective of the presence of a profit sharing scheme. Moreover, the strong 
presence of productive and highly skilled employees may increase the productivity of less 
productive employees through mutual and cooperative learning efforts. In this case, these 
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employee teams differ from teams in the more traditional firms paying fixed wages. This very 
likely causes differences in any performance measure, including innovativeness. Furthermore, 
it is quite realistic to assume that employees behave risk-averse and prefer a fixed wage over a 
variable, performance-related pay. If, for a moment, we set aside the argument raised before, 
i.e. that profit sharing usually complements the fixed wage, instead of replacing it, firms 
paying a flexible wage presumably attract less risk-averse workers. It is not unreasonable to 
assume that these employees are also more productive. Finally, selectivity in innovation 
activities may arise. It is quite plausible that highly innovative companies also use efficient 
incentive systems, simply because they are managed in a better way. Hence, a positive 
correlation between innovative activity and the use of profit sharing in the remuneration 
policy may be due to an unobserved third factor, while actually no causal relation exists. 
If selectivity is at work, any empirical methodology neglecting this problem will 
produce biased results. Using the Heckman estimator, the early study of FitzRoy and Kraft 
[1995] confirms the strong presence of selectivity effects. Profit sharing is proved to be 
endogenous with respect to any outcome measure. Another sophisticated method to deal with 
selectivity is the non-parametric matching approach, well known in the so-called treatment 
analysis. Treatment in our case is defined as the use of profit sharing. This methodology goes 
back to Roy [1951] and Rubin [1974] and has also been labelled the potential outcome 
approach. A matching approach re-establishes the conditions of an experiment and compares 
treated and non-treated observations. The control sample of non-treated companies is selected 
carefully, to maximize its similarity with the population of treated companies. Every single 
treated company is related to non-treated units: conditioning on their similarity, a non-treated 
firm receives a high or low weight, or even is omitted. The determination of the control 
observation’s importance (weight) depends on the selected matching estimator (see Heckman 
et al. [1997]).  
Rubin [1974] defines the impact of the treatment as the difference between the likely 
outcome Y of an establishment2 introducing profit sharing, Y1, and the counterfactual 
outcome in the case of non-introduction, Y0, given D=1: 
(1)   )1()1()1( 0101  DYEDYEDYYE  
where D is a binary assignment indicator determining whether the firm has introduced profit 
sharing (D=1) or not (D=0). Parameter  measures the average treatment effect on the treated 
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firms and determines whether the use of profit sharing is beneficial to those establishments 
that introduced this incentive scheme in their remuneration policy.  
The fundamental problem in evaluation econometrics arises from the fact that the 
second term on the right hand side, i.e. the counterfactual outcome E(Y0|D=1), is by definition 
not observable, since it describes the hypothetical outcome of a firm that actually introduced 
profit sharing if it would not have done so. In the absence of selectivity, the following 
equality: 
(2) )0()1( 00  DYEDYE  
would hold and the average outcome of firms without profit sharing would provide an 
estimate for )1( 0 DYE . This assumption is valid in an experiment where randomisation of 
the treatment is given. However, as FitzRoy and Kraft [1995] have shown and as we argued 
before, it is quite unlikely that profit sharing and non-profit sharing firms do not differ with 
respect to certain characteristics: profit sharing is endogenous, which introduces a bias in the 
estimates. The key to solve this evaluation problem is to approximate the counterfactual 
outcome. We chose to follow the potential outcome (i.e. matching) approach and, in a second 
step, additionally consider a time dimension, by applying the so-called conditional difference-
in-differences technique. In the following paragraphs we explain the details of this 
methodology. 
Rubin’s [1977] conditional independence assumption (CIA) states that the treatment 
status and the potential outcome are independent for observations exhibiting the same 
observable set of characteristics X. The validity of the CIA depends on whether all 
determinants influencing the decision to introduce profit sharing as well as the potential 
outcome are known and available for all observations. However, the CIA cannot be tested 
formally and as a result, the researcher is obliged to rely on the data quality. We believe that 
the IAB Establishment Panel, which will be described in more detail below, covers a wide 
array of information, ranging from general information on the establishments to questions on 
investment, business policy and development to employment-related questions, and therefore 
serves as a good basis to fulfil this requirement.  
Hence, if sample selection is solely due to observable covariates (a vector X), the CIA 
applies and the following equation holds: 
(3)  x)X 0,D|E(Yx)X 1,D|E(Y 00  . 
8 
 
The treatment effect θ in the matching approach can consequently be estimated by 
comparing the outcome means of the two groups (Lechner [1998]): 
(4) ),0(),1( 01 xXDYExXDYEM  . 
In practice, ensuring the validity of the CIA imposes a major obstacle, since every 
additional exogenous variable in the vector X decreases the probability of finding an adequate 
control group. Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983] proposed a remedy to this dimensionality 
problem. As an alternative to matching on a large set of covariates, their idea is to match on 
one single index. This so-called propensity score is estimated with information on the 
exogenous characteristics X. Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983] show that, if the CIA is fulfilled, 
one does not need to condition on all covariates contained in X, but only on the propensity 
score. In our case, this index is estimated as the conditional probability to use profit sharing, 
i.e. the probability to share profits with the employees, given a set of individual characteristics 
of a firm: pr(D=1|X=x). This propensity score is usually estimated in a probit model.  
Several matching methods have been proposed in the literature on evaluation 
econometrics. We employ nearest neighbour matching, which comes down to a pair wise 
matching as it tries to select the most similar non-treated observation (ideally a “twin”) for 
every treated observation. If the matching procedure was successful, i.e. the establishments 
that did (treated group) and did not (selected control group) use/introduce profit sharing are ex 
ante equally likely to use/introduce profit sharing, equation (3) holds and the causal effect is 
computed as indicated in equation (4), by comparing the outcome means of the two groups.  
The matching approach accounts for the selection bias caused by observable factors. 
However, as we mentioned before, compliance with the CIA is crucial to obtain reliable 
estimates: all relevant information should be known and available for all observations. 
Although we strongly believe that our data at hand are very rich, nonetheless, unobservable 
factors may be at work and affect the outcome variable. This could seriously bias the results. 
To correct for this potential selection on unobservables more strongly, the initial matching 
method can be extended with a time dimension. 
This is exactly what we will additionally do in the empirical part of this paper, as we 
have a rich two-period panel dataset at our disposal. We present two evaluation methods, 
assessing the evolution of the outcome Y after treatment. Besides a matching approach, 
matching and difference-in-differences techniques are combined in the second method, which 
is referred to as the conditional difference-in-differences (CDiD) or matched difference-in-
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differences approach (Heckman et al. [1997]). When we only take into account selection on 
observable factors, we use a cross-section sample of firms which apply profit sharing in 2009 
and compare them with a matched sample of firms without profit sharing. For the CDiD 
approach we concentrate on firms which introduced profit sharing between 2005 and 2009 
and firms which never used profit sharing during this time period.  
The general difference-in-differences (DiD) set-up relates the development of an 
outcome variable of treated observations to the evolution of this outcome variable in a control 
group of non-treated observations. The before-after change in the outcome of non-treated 
firms is subtracted from the before-after change in the outcome of the treated firms to obtain 
the average treatment effect θ: 
(5) )00()11( 0011
0101
 DYDYEDYDYE ttttDiD , 
where D denotes whether the unit under consideration is treated (D=1) or not (D=0), Y is the 
outcome variable and t represents the moments in time before (t0) and after (t1) the 
introduction of the measure. The DiD estimator thus measures the excess outcome growth of 
the treated as compared to the non-treated group, correcting for any macro-economic change 
over time. Including additional regressors X combines the advantages of the matching and the 
DiD approach (Blundell and Costa Dias [2000]): the impact of profit sharing is evaluated over 
time, for twin samples of firms with and without profit sharing. This conditional difference-
in-differences (CDiD) approach eliminates time-invariant unobserved individual-specific 
effects as well as common macro trends. Several studies evaluating active labour market 
policies make use of this estimator (e.g. Kluve et al. [1999], Eichler and Lechner [2002], 
Bergemann et al. [2004]). The treatment and control group are matched on observable 
characteristics X such that:  
(6)        .,0,0,0,0 0011
0101
 xXDYxXDY xXDYxXDY tttt   
To increase the accurateness and quality of the matching process, additional activities 
were carried out. For all treated firms a valid counterpart should be found in the non-treated 
population and every firm should represent a potential profit sharing company. If the samples 
of treated and non-treated firms would have no or only little overlap in the exogenous 
characteristics X, matching is not applicable to obtain consistent estimates. Hence, the so-
called common support restriction is imposed and all firms exhibiting extreme values and 
therefore complicating the matching process are removed. We employ the conditional 
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difference-in-differences approach with nearest neighbour propensity score matching and 
match without replacement, which means that every control observation can only be used 
once for matching. The average treatment effect θ is calculated as follows: 
(7) .),00
0
(),00
1
(),11
0
(),11
1
(  xXDtYExXDtYE xXDtYExXDtYECDiD 


 

    
We match firms which introduced profit sharing between period t0 and t1 to firms which 
have never shared profits, using their respective vectors of exogenous characteristics X in 
period t0. Then, we evaluate how the outcome Y of both groups (treated versus non-treated 
subjects) has evolved over time, comparing static (assessing Y in period t1) and dynamic 
(comparing Y in the periods t0 and t1) variables for the treated and non-treated firms in t-tests 
on mean equality3.  
The data 
This section describes the data which will be used to empirically investigate the 
interaction between profit sharing and innovative performance in Germany. Bellmann and 
Möller [2011] find that, throughout the period from 2001 to 2009, only about 9% of the total 
population of German firms employed this incentive system in addition to the normal wages.  
The percentage of companies sharing profits with employees heavily fluctuates according to 
size and industry affiliation, though. This percentage puts Germany on a mediocre rank, after 
France (57%), the UK (40%) and Sweden (20%). Van Den Bulcke [1999] identifies factors 
yielding a less favourable environment with respect to financial participation (which is more 
general than mere profit sharing) of German employees: the German tax situation and social 
security, the complex legislation and the lack of a share ownership culture and tradition. 
We constructed our database using various waves of the so-called IAB Establishment 
panel. Since 1993 (1996 for East Germany) the Institute for Employment Research (Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung: IAB) yearly surveys a panel of about 16,000 German 
companies. Based on size and industry affiliation, the sample of surveyed companies is 
randomly drawn from the employment statistics register of the German Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). Because companies drop out due to non-response or 
market exit and new companies are continuously established, new companies are added to the 
sample every year, which results in an unbalanced panel structure. The survey gathers general 
company information on its establishment, turnover, staffing, investments, etc. but also leaves 
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room for very specific questions, e.g. on public funding, innovation, technical equipment, etc. 
which are covered on an irregular basis, though. 
Our key issue of interest is whether or not companies allow their employees to share in 
the profit. This information is reflected by the dummy variable PROF. Based on the 
theoretical arguments presented above, we advance the hypothesis that profit sharing exerts a 
positive impact on the innovative capabilities of a company. To test our hypotheses, we first 
select all manufacturing companies from the IAB Establishment Panel which use profit 
sharing in 2009 and compare them to a control group of companies which indicated that they 
did not employ profit sharing in their remuneration system in 2009. We eliminate all the 
differences in exogenous variables to counter the selectivity issue, employing the matching 
method. Moreover we use a second sample consisting of firms which did not use profit 
sharing in 2005 but introduced it between 2005 and 2009. These firms are compared with 
those which did not apply profit sharing throughout the whole period in a conditional 
difference-in-differences framework. This will enable us to evaluate the impact of the 
introduction of a profit sharing system on a company’s innovativeness.  
The outcome to be evaluated is twofold: we test whether profit sharing fosters process 
and/or product innovation. We employ static matching and conditional difference-in-
differences (CDiD). The matching procedure compares the values of our outcome variables in 
the year 2009. The CDiD computes the difference in growth rates for the variables of interest 
over the time period 2005 to 2009. In particular we proceed as follows. First, we evaluate the 
company’s innovative strength with respect to technological capabilities. TECH measures the 
condition of a company’s technical equipment on a five-point Likert scale, going from fully 
up-to-date (score = 1) to fully outdated (score = 5). As the data do not provide any explicit 
information on the process innovation capabilities of a company, we believe that this variable 
is a good proxy. ADVNAR (ADV = advanced; NAR = narrow) and ADV indicate whether 
the company’s technical equipment is fully up-to-date (TECH = 1 and TECH =2 or 3, 
respectively). In the CDID framework we use dynamic variables, reflecting the evolution of 
the condition of the technical equipment. The first dynamic variable is TECHch, measuring 
the difference in the condition of the technological equipment between 2009 and 2005. 
However, we deliberate about the trade off between the econometric inaccurateness of using 
the difference in an index value on the one hand and the full use of the available information 
on the other hand. That is why we additionally include a dummy variable reflecting the 
evolution of the company’s technological equipment. We compute a variable indicating 
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whether the company improved its technological strength and became a highly advanced 
technology user (ADVNARch = 1 if TECH05 ≥2 and TECH09 =1). We expect all process 
innovation measures to be affected in a significantly positive way by the introduction of a 
profit sharing system. 
Second, product innovation is evaluated.The information for 2005 was taken from the 
2004 wave of the IAB panel, as product innovation was not covered in the 2005 wave. We 
assume that the innovative capability of 2004 is a good approximation for the innovativeness 
in 2005. INPDT indicates whether the company improved or further developed a product 
which was already comprised in the company’s portfolio, within the last year (2008).4 
NEWFRM measures whether the company adopted a product which was new to the firm, 
within the last year (2008). NEWMKT measures whether the company adopted a product 
which was new to the market, within the last year (2008). INNO equals 1 when at least one of 
the variables INPDT, NEWFRM or NEWMKT is 1 and hence labels companies as innovative 
or non-innovative in a very broad sense. For the CDID approach the dynamic variables are 
computed as the difference between 2009 and 2005: INPDTch (INPDT09-INPDT05), 
NEWFRMch (NEWFRM09-NEWFRM05), NEWMKTch (NEWMKT09-NEWMKT05) and 
INNOch (INNO09-INNO05). As argued in section 2, we expect to find indications that profit 
sharing affects a company’s product innovation capabilities, in addition to the effect on the 
technical equipment. The impact on improvements or the introduction of new-to-the-firm 
products is expected to be stronger than the impact on the development of totally new (new-
to-the-market) products. 
We use several control variables which may affect both the probability to employ a 
profit sharing remuneration system in addition to a fixed wage and innovative capability of a 
company, respectively. In the second sample where we analyse the effects of an introduction 
of profit sharing we use control variables in 2005 to estimate the probability to introduce 
profit sharing between 2005 and 2009. Including the number of employees (EMP) allows 
controlling for size effects, which are empirically often found to explain innovativeness (see 
e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman [1999]). Moreover, size may be related to the company’s choice 
for a specific incentive scheme. For example, as smaller firms may be better aware of 
employees’ individual performance, they may opt for other financial rewards than a profit 
sharing scheme. The logarithmic transformation (lnEMP) is used to smooth this variable. 
Next, we introduce a number of control variables related to the organizational structure of the 
firm: the ratio of qualified employees (QUAL) and dummies indicating a shift in 
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responsibilities (SHIFT), the introduction of team work (TEAM) and independent work 
groups (INDEP) as well as positive investments in ICT infrastructure (ICT) reflect how a 
company responds to requirements of its environment. Complex and interdependent 
workflows imply more difficulties in measuring individual output. Moreover, information 
asymmetries and monitoring problems may be more pronounced. Also a range of variables 
characterizing how the company interacts with its direct stakeholders is important. First, a 
high level of trust between employees and managers facilitates consultation and fine-tunes 
cooperation engagements. The presence of a works council (COUNCIL) is a good proxy for 
this relationship. Second, the relationship between the company and the unions may be 
important. As we will explain in the following paragraph, Germany is a special case and the 
works council tends to substitute for the strength of the union, so the variable COUNCIL also 
reflects the union’s power to some extent. In addition, we include a dummy variable (CAO) 
indicating whether a collective labour agreement is in place. Limited liability may foster the 
introduction of profit sharing; LTD has value 1 for joint stock companies (AG) and non-
public limited liability companies (GmbH). Moreover, profit sharing can be used to shift risks 
to the employees, which may be especially valuable for firms whose profits are risky. Thus, 
we include the export share (EXPORT) of firms. Last, some final company characteristics are 
added. After1990 is a dummy indicating whether the company was established after 1990, as 
profit sharing and age may interact. Also, firms located in East Germany (EAST = 1) may be 
less likely to introduce profit sharing (Möller [2002] as well as Bellman and Möller [2006]). 
Finally, industry affiliation may matter. We limit our sample to manufacturing firms, 
excluding agriculture, mining and construction and include 15 industry dummies (BR) in the 
analysis.  
Our first sample for the matching approach consists of 1923 firms of which 385 use 
profit sharing in 2009. The second sample with introduction of profit sharing as treatment of 
interest includes observations of 1447 companies, of which 132 firms introduce profit sharing. 
In both cases, the first empirical step is the selection of a non-profit sharing twin company for 
each profit sharing firm. To this end, a propensity score is estimated in probit models, using 
the control variables introduced above. For both samples, the summary statistics of these 
variables (for the introduction sample in period t0=2005) as well as the outcome variables for 
the introduction sample between the two periods t0=2005 and t1=2009) are presented in Table 
I. In both samples there are significant differences between firms with and without profit 
sharing in almost all of the considered determinants.  
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--- Place Table I approximately here --- 
A large body of literature addresses the correlation between a strong union presence on 
the one hand and R&D and innovative activity on the other hand. This is highly relevant in 
the current paper, as the presence of a strong union may be correlated with our treatment as 
well as outcome variables. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen [2003] survey the literature in this 
domain and conclude that North American studies consistently reveal a strongly negative 
correlation, while European studies cannot substantiate any significant impact of the union on 
R&D and innovation. The studies investigating this issue in Germany are Addison and 
Wagner [1994], Schnabel and Wagner [1992a,b, 1994] as well as Fitzroy and Kraft [1990]. 
Schnabel and Wagner [1992b] ascribe the neutral relationship to the more cooperative nature 
of industrial relations in Germany.  
The relevant labour institutions on the plant and firm level are the unions and also the 
works councils (see the Works Constitution Act5). Addison et al. [1996] point out that the 
German situation is highly specific, because the workplace representation occurs rather 
through the mechanism of the works council than through the union. As the ties between the 
union and the works council are very close, they suggest that the works council substitutes for 
the union institution in the German case. So, we feel confident here to assume that the 
presence of a works council and the union’s bargaining power (variables COUNCIL and 
CAO) have no impact on the innovative activity in German firms. Adversely, these variables 
are expected to have an impact on the propensity to introduce profit sharing, i.e. our treatment 
variable.  
After the matching, the evolution in the outcome variables (both static and dynamic) is 
evaluated for the subsample of matched pairs. This approach eliminates a considerable share 
of observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in the treated and non-treated firms in the 
population and mitigates the potential selectivity bias. The CDiD approach conducts two-
sided t-tests to compare the means of the two groups after the matching.  
Estimates 
The potential presence of selectivity in this evaluation exercise was introduced in the 
methodological section. Because of this potential endogeneity, a simple comparison of the 
outcome variables between companies with and without profit sharing (as presented in Table 
I) does not provide an adequate answer in this evaluation research; the introduction of profit 
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sharing may be induced by innovativeness. We observe significant differences in the 
innovative strength between profit sharing companies and the potential control group. 
However, the control variables differ significantly as well and these differences may also 
explain differences in innovativeness. We address this potential selection bias empirically 
starting from nearest neighbour propensity score matching. Then we switch to the CDiD 
approach to assess the evolution of the outcome variables over time. This technique ensures 
that both observable and unobservable differences between treated and non-treated companies 
are taken into account, as well as any macro-economic change over time. We believe that the 
data at hand is sufficiently rich and that the matching procedure significantly curtails the 
selection bias. As a result, any potentially remaining difference in the outcome variables can 
be attributed to the introduction of profit sharing6. 
To select a non-profit sharing twin company for each profit sharing company, we first 
estimate the propensity scores, which reflects the probability that a company remunerates its 
employees with a system of profit sharing in addition to a fixed wage. The two models for 
existence and introduction of profit sharing are presented in Table II. In both probit models, 
size (lnEMP), the presence of a works council (COUNCIL), investment in ICT (ICT) and the 
export share (EXPORT) are significant. For existence of profit sharing in the first sample, 
also the share of qualified employees (QUAL) positively affects the probability to use profit 
sharing. These estimates confirm expectations formulated in the section on selectivity. 
Smaller companies rather opt for other incentive schemes than profit sharing. The presence of 
a works council, reflecting a high level of trust between company owners and employees, also 
create a favourable setting for a profit sharing incentive scheme.  
--- Place Table II approximately here --- 
The probit model provides estimated propensity scores and enables us to select similar 
companies. After the matching process, any difference in the control variables is eliminated 
and the remaining differences in outcome variables can be attributed to the 
existence/introduction of a profit sharing system. In the first analysis, we evaluate differences 
for the outcome variables in 2009 between the profit sharing firms and their selected twin 
partners, respectively. The upper part of Table III shows the difference in outcome variables, 
which reflect innovative capabilities. Profit sharing companies are more likely to have a fully 
up-to-date technical equipment (TECH). They are only somewhat more eager to use advanced 
technologies (ADV is marginally significant and ADVNAR is insignificant) The lower part of 
Table III shows that additionally controlling for unobservable differences leads to different 
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results. We do not find evidence that companies introducing profit sharing experience a 
stronger development in the process innovation variables (TECHch, ADVNARch) compared 
to firms without profit sharing.  
 In the static approach, also the outcome variables measuring product innovation 
significantly differ after the matching. We notice that profit sharing companies are more 
likely to have improved a product in the company’s existing portfolio (INPDT), introduced a 
new-to-the-firm product (NEWFRM marginally significant) and even a new-to-the-market 
product (NEWMKT). The general measure on product innovativeness shows that they are 
more innovative in comparison with companies that did not introduce profit sharing (INNO). 
As profit sharing increases employee involvement in the innovation process, they are more 
likely to disclose relevant and valuable information. Our expectation was that the impact of 
profit sharing is larger with respect to process than product innovation. However, most of the 
dynamic variables reflecting the change in companies’ product innovation capabilities point to 
the existence of effects, which is however not the case for product innovation. The 
introduction of profit sharing is associated with a significant (on the 5% level) increase of 
products which are new to the firm (NEWFRMch), and we find weakly significant impacts 
with respect to improvements and further development of already existing products 
(INPDTch) and the encompassing variable standing for product innovation in general 
INNOch (lower part of Table III). In contrast, based on the conditional difference-in-
differences framework we cannot find evidence in favour of  the introduction of products new 
for the market. These results are in accordance with our expectations that employees’ 
involvement is more beneficial for improvements of existing products and introduction of 
products new to the firm than it is for innovations new to the market.  
It is perhaps surprising that the conditional difference-in-differences models show a 
strong impact of profit sharing on product innovation but none for process innovation. 
However, as it is well known the lack of statistical evidence is not the proof of absence of a 
relation. One reason for no statistical evidence may be weak measurement. The variables 
available for determining technical progress are based on scales, which imply subjective 
evaluations of the state of technical progress by the management. This subjective evaluation 
may well change without a true reason within the same establishment from one year to the 
other, in particular if the responding person is not the same The variables concerning product 
innovation offer less room for individual and subjective evaluations.  
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Furthermore in case of difference-in-differences our conclusions are based on just 132 
establishments, which introduce profit sharing during the relevant period. Hence while taking 
account of unobserved heterogeneity is surely useful, more observations with changes in the 
relevant variable would be most helpful in identifying possible effects.  
--- Place Table III approximately here --- 
Conclusion 
We empirically investigated the impact of profit sharing on the innovative capabilities 
of German manufacturing companies. Since the introduction of a profit sharing system may 
be endogenous, we employ matching and the CDiD approach. Once the potential selection 
bias is eliminated, in a static approach companies with and without a profit sharing system 
still differ significantly in their innovativeness. Profit sharing companies outperform non-
profit sharing companies on both process and product innovativeness. However, according to 
the results of the CDiD method only product innovation is enhanced by the introduction of 
profit sharing. Hence firms introducing profit sharing are already more innovative before they 
launch the variable incentive method of profit sharing, with respect to both product and 
process innovations. However, profit sharing additionally has a positive effect on product 
innovations. 
In Bellmann and Möller [2006] two profiles of companies introducing profit sharing 
emerge. On the one hand profit sharing companies are the larger companies with a complex 
working environment, introducing profit sharing to motivate the workforce. On the other hand 
also small and young, technology-oriented firms introduce profit sharing as they do not have 
substantial resources to attract and keep highly qualified employees; the profit premium is 
treated as a bonus to the regular pay slip. The firms in our sample, introducing profit sharing, 
are mainly the larger firms, with a more complex work environment and a high level of trust 
between employees and managers. The ownership structure as well as industry affiliation is 
relevant, too. The age of the company does not seem to matter. Therefore, the firms in our 
sample seem to belong mainly to the first profile. Hence, the impact of profit sharing on 
innovativeness may be different in smaller high-tech firms. 
The results presented in this paper establish valid proof supporting the hypotheses 
developed on the impact of profit sharing on a company’s innovative activity. However, as 
new survey waves will become available and existing datasets may be extended, robustness 
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checks, e.g. with different specifications of the moment when the economic return becomes 
apparent, different measures of innovativeness, etc. will provide valuable additional insights 
into this domain. We already discussed the limitations of our variables on process innovations 
and perhaps over time also alternative measures on process innovations will become 
available.  
An interesting point of view was advanced by Lerner and Wulf [2007], who link 
different incentive schemes to reward R&D managers to patenting activity. Also the size of 
the profit premium, instead of mere stochastic information on the application of this 
remuneration scheme, could yield an interesting path for further research, as the impact of 
profit sharing may be heterogeneous in size. 
Although our results suggest that profit sharing adds to companies’ innovative capacity, 
the share of German companies actually employing this system is rather limited in 
comparison with other countries (especially France and the UK). Research on the obstacles 
hampering German employers to let employees share in the profit indicates an unfavourable 
taxation system, the complex legislation system as well as a bad fit with the cultural 
background as key problems (Van Den Bulcke [1999]). Therefore, German policy makers 
may consider designing a more profit sharing friendly environment for German companies. 
Besides the potential positive productivity and employment gains, also the national innovative 
capacity may benefit from this remuneration system. 
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Table I: Summary statistics before the matching 
Variable period Profit-sharing firms Potential control group Difference Mean Mean 
Sample “Existence of profit sharing” 2009
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
Process innovation     
TECH 2009 2.134 2.314 0.179*** 
ADVNAR 2009 0.164 0.136 0.029* 
ADV 2009 0.717 0.605 0.063** 
Product innovation    
INPDT 2009 0.801 0.486 0.315*** 
NEWFRM 2009 0.419 0.254 0.165*** 
NEWMKT 2009 0.230 0.105 0.125*** 
INNO 2009 0.833 0.757 0.076*** 
CONTROL VARIABLES      
lnEMP 2009 4.958 3.252 1.706*** 
QUAL 2009 0.140 0.056 0.085*** 
SHIFT 2009 0.186 0.119 0.067*** 
TEAM 2009 0.145 0.065 0.081*** 
INDEP 2009 0.109 0.049 0.059*** 
ICT 2009 0.667 0.349 0.318*** 
COUNCIL 2009 0.682 0.274 0.409*** 
CAO 2009 0.589 0.397 0.192*** 
LTD    2009 0.938 0.651 0.287*** 
EAST 2009 0.385 0.551 -0.166*** 
EXPORT 2009 0.791 0.424 0.367*** 
Number of obs.: 385 1538  
Sample “Introduction of profit sharing” 2005-2009
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
Process innovation     
TECHch 2005-2009 0.052 0.026 0.029 
ADVNARch 2005-2009 0.075 0.064 0.011 
Product innovation    
INPDTch 2005-2009 0.134 0.014 0.120** 
NEWFRMch 2005-2009 0.149 0.023 0.126*** 
NEWMKTch 2005-2009 0.067 0.019 0.048 
INNOch 2005-2009 0.112 0.025 0.087* 
CONTROL VARIABLES      
lnEMP 2005 4.446 3.061 1.385*** 
QUAL 2005 0.300 0.220 0.080*** 
SHIFT 2005 0.142 0.109 0.033 
TEAM 2005 0.097 0.058 0.061* 
INDEP 2005 0.119 0.041 0.079*** 
ICT 2005 0.716 0.418 0.299*** 
COUNCIL 2005 0.567 0.228 0.339*** 
CAO 2005 0.552 0.396 0.156*** 
LTD   2005 0.881 0.603 0.278*** 
EAST 2005 0.433 0.559 -0.126*** 
EXPORT 2005 0.709 0.369 0.340*** 
Number of obs.: 132 1315  
Note: the details of BR are not presented here. 
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Table II: Propensity to employ profit-sharing 
Sample “Existence of profit sharing” 2009
  Probit estimates 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
lnEMP 0.154 *** 0.037 
QUAL 1.574 *** 0.312 
SHIFT° -0.12  0.105 
TEAM° 0.231 * 0.121 
INDEP° 0.072  0.140 
ICT° 0.274 *** 0.081 
COUNCIL° 0.265 ** 0.109 
CAO° -0.026  0.091 
LTD° 0.229 * 0.128 
AFTER1990° 0.057  0.095 
EAST° -0.159  0.097 
EXPORT 0.230 ** 0.094 
constant -1.924 *** 0.271 
Log-Likelihood -745 
Pseudo R² 0.226 
# obs. 1923 
Sample “Introduction of profit sharing” 2005-2009
  Probit estimates 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
lnEMP 0.110 ** 0.053 
QUAL 0.169  0.261 
SHIFT° -0.026  0.156 
TEAM° -0.034  0.193 
INDEP° 0.418 ** 0.196 
ICT° 0.254 ** 0.118 
COUNCIL° 0.283 * 0.146 
CAO° -0.046  0.122 
LTD° 0.218  0.152 
AFTER1990° 0.022  0.138 
EAST° -0.003  0.139 
EXPORT 0.254 ** 0.126 
constant -2.506 *** 0.551 
Log-Likelihood -374 
Pseudo R² 0.155 
# obs. 1447 
  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). Industry dummies (BR) included. 
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Table III: Outcome variables matched samples 
 Profit-sharing firms Selected control group θ  Mean Mean 
Sample “Existence of profit sharing” 2009
Process innovation       
TECH 2.136 2.251 -0.115 ** 
ADVNAR 0.165 0.136 0.029  
ADV 0.716 0.653 0.063 * 
Product innovation     
INPDT  0.802 0.715 0.086 *** 
NEWFRM  0.420 0.360 0.060 *  
NEWMKT 0.230 0.149 0.081 *** 
INNO 0.833 0.757 0.076 *** 
Sample “Introduction of profit sharing” 2005-2009
Process innovation     
TECHch 0.047 0.102 -0.055  
ADVNARch 0.078 0.055 0.023  
Product innovation     
INPDTch 0.133  0.000  0.133 * 
NEWFRMch 0.141  -0.039  0.180 ** 
NEWMKTch 0.070 0.008  0.063  
INNOch 0.117  -0.008  0.125 * 
Note: the control variables (lnEMP, QUAL, SHIFT, TEAM, INDEP, ICT, COUNCIL, CAO, LTD, AFTER1990, 
EAST, EXPORT and BR) as well as the propensity score are not significantly different after the matching and 
therefore not reported here. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of the t-tests on mean equality 
between the sample of funded firms and the selected control group. θ is the average treatment effect of profit-
sharing.  
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Footnotes 
 
                                                          
1 Also ‘capital sharing’ exists, a system in which employees hold shares of the company and in this sense, 
become co-owners of the company. This issue lies beyond the framework of this paper, though. 
2 For the sake of readability we omit firm indices in the equations. 
3 CdiD can also be applied for repeated cross section. Cf. for a description of this method Blundell and Costa 
Dias (2009) and for an application Aerts and Schmidt (2008).  
 
4 In 2004 all questions on process innovations are asked with respect to innovations within the two preceding 
years. 
 
5 This Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) was issued in 1972. 
6 Difference-in-differences controls for common time trends and permanent differences between the two groups 
considered. Therefore a crucial assumption of diff-in-diff is that firms with and without profit sharing do not 
seriously change in their characteristics over time. (Time-invariance of unobserved individual factors.) These 
assumptions must be valid in order that this approach works (see e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). Our time 
period considered (2005-2009) seems to be rather long, but it is quite unlikely that any effect on innovation will 
occur and will be measured during a shorter time period. 
 
